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Abstract:
This paper examines the role foreign influence had on the outcomes of the 2011 Arab
Spring Revolutions in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. Foreign influence primarily came from the US,
European states such as the UK and France, and Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and
UAE. Influence includes but is not limited to financial assistance, diplomatic pressure, and in
Libya’s extreme case military intervention. Outcome of the revolution is determined by
examining the state of each government before and after the 2011 revolutions. This paper studies
why each of these three states had different levels of foreign influence throughout their
transitions from longstanding dictatorships to the current governments that run each state today.
It also studies why Tunisia, which had very little foreign influence, developed into a free and
democratic state while Egypt and Libya ended up with another autocratic regime after many
states played a role in their revolutions. It explains that the pressure the West faced to overthrow
autocrats Qaddafi and Mubarak along with the lack of desire to engage in a third national
building enterprise led to an overthrow of the original governments without a foundation to
develop a new government. This along with the Gulf States’ interest in increasing their regional
power led to the failure of both revolutions as Egypt returned to an autocracy and Libya turned
into a failed state with multiple governments at war. While Tunisia, who had little foreign
intervention successfully transitioned from an autocracy into a free and democratic state.

Introduction:
At the end of 2010, a Tunisian street vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on
fire to protest the oppression of Tunisia’s Ben Ali regime (Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens
2014). The martyrdom of Bouazizi sparked revolutions in Tunisia and many other Arab states in
the Middle East and North Africa. These revolutions known as the Arab Spring, provided the
opportunity for many states in the region to overthrow their longstanding autocratic regimes and
replace them with democracies. At the time there were few democratic states in the Middle East

and North Africa, so this indicated there was a possibility that the Arab Spring marked the
beginning of the region’s democratic transition (Lynch 2018). But this was not the case as most
states failed to overthrow the autocratic governments in place and returned to conditions similar
to before Arab Spring (Lynch 2018). Some states such as Egypt and Libya, overthrew the
autocratic governments in power in 2011 but failed to replace them with democracies. Only
Tunisia was successful in replacing their longtime dictator with a stable democracy.
This paper will examine some of the factors that caused Tunisia to have the only
successful transition to democracy and freedom while Egypt and Libya overthrew their leaders
and the revolution failed to make the same transition. The primary factor it will review is the
amount of foreign involvement in both the revolution and the transition process. This foreign
involvement includes but is not limited to the amount of interest states had in each state both
economic and humanitarian, economic pressure or support, rhetorical support or opposition by
state leaders, and in the most extreme cases military intervention (Phiri and Matambo 2017). The
actors’ involvement that this paper will examine will be states such as the United States, United
Kingdom, France, and members of the Arab League, specifically Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE.
It will also analyze the role of international organizations such as NATO and the UN. It will
determine how these actors influenced the outcome of the revolutions in Egypt, Libya, and
Tunisia.
The outcome of the revolution will be determined by the current conditions in each state.
The outcome will be defined by how democratic and free each state ended up after their
respective revolutions. This will be determined by examining the Freedom House’s Freedom of
the World Index for all three states. Not only will the type of government be reviewed, but if
there is even a functional government in place will factor into a state’s success or failure. That is

because in Libya’s case, there are multiple governments claiming legitimacy while deeply
entrenched in a civil war for control of the state (Boduszyński 2015).
The hypothesis being tested in this paper is if a state has a higher level of foreign
intervention during a revolution and post-revolution rebuilding process, then the state is less
likely to become a free democratic state after the revolution. This is because foreign intervention
in revolutions hinders a state’s ability to properly create a democracy. Either states are
intervening for their own interest or states are trying to assist in creating a democracy but lack
the proper information or influence on the rebuilding state. A less likely alternate hypothesis is
that if the amount of foreign involvement in a revolution increases, the chance the state becomes
free and democratic remains the same. Based on the current condition of Libya, it is extremely
unlikely that foreign intervention was helpful in developing freedom and democracy during these
revolutions. They currently are in a bloody civil war and on the verge of failed statehood so if
there was foreign intervention, it either had no impact or hurt the state ((Boduszyński 2015).
Foreign intervention may have no impact on the outcome of revolutions and the likelihood of
free democracies forming maybe entirely dependent on domestic factors, regardless of the
foreign factors involved.
Overall this will reflect how foreign intervention was ultimately harmful during Arab
Spring Revolutions. Since Tunisia was the most isolated state and the most successful while
failed transitions in Egypt and Libya faced intervention from a variety of different actors, and
Libya even endured military intervention, shows that there is a possibility that foreign
involvement hindered these states’ pursuit of democracy (Moghadam 2017). This could be
because the foreign involvement was only beneficial to the interests of the actors intervening.
The West could have been more inclined to intervene in Libya because of the presence of oil and

the established notorious reputation of dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi for being a thorn in the
West’s side for decades along with having a poor human rights record (Khan and Mezran 2016).
In Egypt, the Gulf States possibly saw an opportunity to destabilize a traditional power in the
region and Western powers had yet another opportunity to oust another dictator in Hosni
Mubarak (Collins and Rothe 2012). Immediately after Mubarak was overthrown, hardline Islam
began to rise with the Muslim Brotherhood as it is likely that both intervening groups did not
want Egypt to turn into an extreme Islamist state, viewing military autocracy as the preferable
alternative (Arena 2016). Tunisia faced very little such external influences and ultimately
became a democratic and free state. This is probably because the Tunisian people had strong
institutions in place during their revolution that helped them during their transition. Since they
had no foreign powers assist them in overthrowing Ben Ali, they needed to establish stable and
organized opposition themselves, leaving a foundation for a successful state post revolution
(Mullin and Shahshahani 2012). The transition was not seamless, and it is still not fully complete
today, but having them work through the issues themselves is better for long term success.
Determining if foreign intervention hurt the Arab Spring revolutions in North African
states is significant in determining future international policy for when states undergo
revolutions. If it is found that foreign influence hindered these states, it could question traditional
liberal ideals about how democracies needs to actively spread democracy around the world. It
could show that it is best for a state’s long-term development to naturally overthrow their
autocrat rather than having other states help. US intervention in both Afghanistan and Iraq failed
at the nation-building phase and the revolution in Syria has turned into a massive proxy war
because of the number of actors now involved in the conflict. This could display that staying out

of a domestic conflict could lead to democracy, even in regions such as MENA that have not
seen much democratic success.
Literature Review:
There has been some prior literature on the role of foreign involvement and some of the
negative consequences of foreign intervention. Phiri and Matambo focus on foreign intervention
in Africa. They argue that Africa has been so reliant on Western (UN Security Council, EU, US,
UK, France) foreign involvement that it has ultimately been harmful for their development (Phiri
and Matambo 2017). This has prevented African states from solving their own problems which
has hindered their ability to solve future problems and stunted the growth of Africa (Phiri and
Matambo 2017). With the West always solving Africa’s problems, Africa cannot develop on
their own since they have always relied on the West to intervene and solve their problems (Phiri
and Matambo 2017). This makes sense because if states are often depending on foreign
intervention they will not build up the capacity to deal with the problems themselves. So, when
future problems arise they will struggle with them more since they lack the experience of solving
problems. This supports the hypothesis that foreign intervention ultimately hurts a state’s ability
to create a free democratic post-revolution.
Not only do Phiri and Matambo discuss how Western intervention has hindered Africa’s
growth, they also examine why the West will intervene in some African conflicts but not others.
They explained that the West will only intervene in African security conflicts if it helps their
economic interests (Phiri and Matambo 2017). If African security was paramount over Western
economic interests, the French would not have immediately left tiny resource poor Rwanda when
the Rwandan Genocide broke out (Phiri and Matambo 2017). Smaller states such as Rwanda
have often been ignored by the West while resource rich states such as Libya often face Western

intervention (Phiri and Matambo 2017). Prioritizing Western economic interests over African
interests led to poor results in African conflicts. It has led to multinational corporations depleting
African states of their natural resources which takes away from African industry and prevents
their economic growth (Phiri and Matambo 2017). These economic factors are detrimental for
the growth of African states because the loss of African industry at the expense of the West
prevents African states from having the economic muscle to deal with their own conflicts (Phiri
and Matambo 2017). Also, since the West is primarily interested in economic gain during
intervention, their intervention might not be helpful in dealing with the conflict.
The findings of Albornoz and Hauk correspond with the idea that states will only
intervene if their economic interests are at stake. They analyzed the US involvement in civil wars
and found that they were much more likely to intervene in a civil war if it would benefit them
economically (Albornoz and Hauk 2014). This analysis also determined that foreign intervention
in civil wars would often prolong these conflicts. That is because it was always uncertain how
much the third party would intervene so one side would never truly know the capability of their
opponent (Albornoz and Hauk 2014). The intervening state often does not give a full
commitment to ending the conflict as they only will assist to the point in which their economic
benefit of intervening outweighs the cost of war (Albornoz and Hauk 2014). These commitment
problems were also troublesome for the side receiving the foreign help because they were not
sure how much the third party would help them and if they help they were receiving was serving
their best interest in the conflict.
This economic driven intervention can lead to policy decisions that further hinder the
conflict state. Since the West is intervening for economic gain, they will often support the side
that will help their interests rather than the side that is best for the state at war (Phiri and

Matambo 2017). The West will sometimes prop up regimes that are unpopular with the people
within that state just to preserve Western economic interests (Phiri and Matambo 2017). This
will prevent the intervention from gaining popular support which causes the propped regime to
ultimately breakdown after the West leaves (Phiri and Matambo 2017). It is already difficult for
Western intervention to gain popularity in African states because the people will link the
intervention with colonialism (Phiri and Matambo 2017). This phenomenon of harmful
interventions occurred in Somalia in the 1990’s where a proxy war broke out and destabilized
Somalia, and it occurred in Libya during Arab Spring where the West created a power vacuum
by helping rebel groups overthrow Qaddafi (Phiri and Matambo 2017). Foreign actors will only
intervene in revolutions if their interests are at stake, whether they be economic or strategic. This
could lead to a poor outcome of the revolution because foreign actors will only be looking out
for their interests, not how the revolting state ends up.
Western states will often act under the neoliberal framework and intervene to protect
their interests under the disguise of promoting democracy. The United States will promote the
spread of democracy and social justice to protect their foreign political and economic agenda
(Collins and Rothe 2012). Collins and Rothe used the revolution in Egypt as an example of when
the US put their interests over democratic ideals. Before the Arab Spring Revolution in Egypt,
the US and its allies supported the repressive Mubarak regime (Collins and Rothe 2012). The US
provided Egypt with $2 billion per year since 1979 of military aid to secure an ally in the Middle
East and have access to the Suez Canal (Collins and Rothe 2012). At any point from this time,
the US could have put economic pressure on Mubarak to treat his people better, but they never
did (Collins and Rothe 2012). After protests broke out, President Obama was hesitant to turn on
Mubarak and waited until the Egyptian people were ready to overthrow him (Collins and Rothe

2012). After Mubarak was overthrown the US gave Egypt billions of dollars in aid to prevent
their economy from collapsing and to keep a traditional ally stable, thus protecting US interests
in the region (Collins and Rothe 2012). The US also initially supported Morsi until the Islamic
fundamentalists were winning the elections, as having Islamists in power in Egypt would be
harmful for the US (Collins and Rothe 2012). The idea of fake liberalism in which the West tells
the rest of the world they are promoting democracy and freedom while looking out for their
interests is evident in the Arab Spring. It was especially obvious in Egypt as the US was more
focused on propping up governments that kept a traditional ally stable instead of actually nation
building and promoting democratic values.
Although most of the literature about foreign intervention in revolutions is about
intervention from the West, there are some sources that believe that the West and traditional
liberal democratic values are losing influence. The argument was that the world influence of
democracies has decreased since the 1990’s (Plattner 2015). That is because in the 1990’s the
world system was extremely unipolar with the US and its allies as the only major world power
after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Plattner 2015). These democracies have been slowly
losing influence because of the rise of strong non-democracies such as China, Russia, and Saudi
Arabia (Plattner 2015). This is significant because it could cause weaker states to transition
towards autocracy when going through regime change if they are under the influence of a strong
autocracy (Plattner 2015). The US and its Western allies were not the only ones involved in the
Arab Spring. Middle Eastern autocracies such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates
were heavily involved in both Egypt and Libya during their revolutions (Lynch 2018). They
were involved to increase their influence over their regional rivals and to overthrow leaders that
they disliked (Lynch 2018). Most literature that focuses on foreign intervention in Arab Spring

Revolutions only studies the influence of the West and does not take into account the influence
of states within the region.
There was also the idea that foreign intervention would have little impact on the spread of
democracy, especially in the Arab Spring. This was the belief that the West could not implant a
Western democracy in a MENA state because they would need to develop their own MENA
version of democracy (Gaffar 2017). This is not saying that democracy is not possible in the
region, but they will create a democracy that is different than the traditional Western model.
Democracy takes a long time to develop and spread and this region was put at a disadvantage for
developing democracy because of how colonization separated groups with European-drawn
borders (Gaffar 2017). The lack of democracy in the region is often attributed to the idea that
Islam and democracy are incompatible (Gaffar 2017), but that is not the case as there are Muslim
democratic states outside of the MENA region and popular opinion polls taken in the region have
resulted in favorable responses for democracy and the relationship between Islam and democracy
(Bratton 2003), (Gaffar 2017). After the Arab Spring, it would make sense for the states that just
experienced revolution to take a long time to develop into a stable democracy. That is because
the states experiencing revolution were often under autocratic rule for decades, so they lack a
democratic foundation. Their neighbors in the region are also not democratic so these states had
no regional model to base their new governments off of. Foreign involvement cannot really
hinder democratic development because the democracy in the is in its infancy stage. But this is
not the case as Tunisia developed into a democracy around 5 years after they overthrew Ben Ali.
The current literature can help justify the hypothesis that foreign intervention hindered
the revolting states. That is because it can explain why foreign actors are deciding to intervene in
these revolutions in the first place. The articles explain that states will only intervene if their

interests are at stake (Phiri and Matambo 2017). Their interests can be either economic or
strategic, and both the West and the Gulf states will intervene to protect them (Lynch 2018). Not
only does this explain why states will intervene, it also explains why this intervention can be
harmful. Since states are only intervening to pursue their own interests, they are not really
looking out for the state they are intervening with and are not worried about their outcome (Phiri
and Matambo 2017). States will not fully commit to one side of the conflict while pursuing their
interests, which escalates and prolongs the conflict (Albornoz and Hauk 2014). Even if states
were not just looking out for their own interests and the West was truly trying to spread
democracy their intervention could have still been harmful. It is difficult for democracy to spread
in a region where there is little democracy and the people in the a must create their own variation
of democracy for it to be successful (Gaffar 2017). This would lead to an unsuccessful outcome
for the West attempting to implement a Western democracy into a MENA state because the
MENA states are not creating their own form of democracy (Gaffar 2017). There is some
literature potentially justifying the alternate no-impact hypothesis if the West had good
intentions. Plattner argued that democracy has lost some of its world influence so Western
intervention in Arab Spring maybe ineffective because of the loss of power of the West (Plattner
2015). But Plattner also discusses the rising power of autocracies such as Saudi Arabia, who was
involved in Arab Spring revolutions looking out for their interests in the region (Plattner 2015).
So even if Western influence has no impact, the primary hypothesis could still be proven by the
influence of the Gulf States.
There is not much literature on the effects of foreign intervention by both the West and
strong Middle Eastern states on the outcome of Arab Spring Revolutions. Most literature also
just examines one state such as Libya, Egypt, or Syria. The one state that successfully

transitioned into a democracy, Tunisia is often overlooked. This paper will compare Tunisia with
the two more discussed North African States; Libya and Egypt and determine how foreign
intervention differently shaped each revolution. It will analyze why there were different levels of
foreign intervention in each state and determine how these different levels helped or hindered
democratic development after the Arab Spring Revolutions.
Research Methodology:
This paper will take a qualitative approach to determine the impact of foreign
intervention on the outcome of Arab Spring Revolutions. It will examine three case studies: the
revolutions of Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. The case studies will be compared using Mill’s Method
of Disagreement. Mill’s Method of Disagreement explains that if subjects being compared have
different outcomes and have many conditions in common except for one, then the one difference
is the cause for the different outcome (Mill 1843). The case studies are similar because three
states are predominantly Muslim states in North Africa that underwent revolutions in 2011 after
decades of autocratic rule. The similar geographic location and similar political and demographic
conditions within each state allows their revolutions to be comparable. Not only did the three
states experience revolutions during the 2011 Arab Spring, they were all ultimately successful in
overthrowing their respective autocratic regimes, unlike many states in the Middle East and
North Africa during the Arab Spring. This allows for a useful comparison between the three
states to determine how each state fared post-revolution and if each state developed a
government more favorable to its people after the revolution.
One major difference between the three states is the amount of foreign intervention that
occurred during the revolutions and throughout the post-revolution nation building. The amount
of foreign intervention is the independent variable as each of the three states experienced a

different level of it throughout Arab Spring. Foreign intervention will be defined as the amount
of involvement another state or international organization had in the outcome of the revolution.
These foreign states primarily include but are not limited to: the US, UK, France, Saudi Arabia,
UAE, and Qatar and the international organizations include the UN Security Council and NATO.
These were the primary actors involved and it is important to determine how both the West and
strong Middle Eastern states influenced these revolutions because most works focus on one or
the other.
Before determining the amount of foreign intervention, the term foreign intervention
must be defined. Foreign intervention is when another state acting either unilaterally or
collectively under an international organization actively attempts to change the outcome of the
revolution or the post-revolution nation building process (Phiri and Matambo 2017). This
includes providing economic support to opposition groups or to the newly formed government,
providing arms to opposing groups, rhetorically supporting the revolutions or new governments
in speeches made by state leaders, providing humanitarian aid, assisting in the creation of the
new government, incentivizing a group to attempt to overthrow the government, and providing
military support during the revolution (Phiri and Matambo 2017). Most if not all of the activities
listed above occurred in at least one of the case studies during Arab Spring. Each state being
studied experienced a different number of scenarios listed above at different severities.
To determine which state had the most foreign intervention, there needs to be a scale that
defines the severity of foreign intervention. This scale will include the number of states involved
with the revolution and the extent to which the get involved. The quantity will be separated into
four possible categories: none, low, medium, and high. None will occur if no foreign states are
involved with the revolution. Low will occur when either Western states or Middle Eastern states

intervene either unilaterally or with an international organization. Medium will occur when both
Western and Middle Eastern states are involved either unilaterally or as a collective with an
international organization. High will occur when both are involved and when states are acting
unilaterally and with an international organization (UNSC, NATO, Arab League). The level will
increase as states from different regions are involved because Western States and Middle Eastern
states generally had different interests when deciding to intervene. The addition of international
organizations and unilateral states for the high level occurred because it would indicate that
unilateral or collective action was not enough for a state to accomplish its goals.
Severity of the intervention will be taken into account along with the quantity as it is
possible that one state could be heavily involved with one revolution and have a greater impact
than a bunch of states being barely involved in another revolution. This severity depends on the
type of involvement along with how much each foreign actor gets involved. For example,
economic involvement would be considered more severe as more money is given to the case
study state. Also, supplying opposition groups is less severe than actual military intervention
since putting their own people on the line indicates a higher degree of involvement. So to
determine the amount of foreign involvement within each case study, it is important to consider
how a state is getting involved, how many states are getting involved, and the severity of the
involvement.
The dependent variable is the outcome of the revolution. This will take into account the
state of the governments that are currently in power in each of the case studies. Current
governments are being studied to show the impact foreign involvement had on the formation of
the new governments. Technically, the outcome of each revolution was the same since each one
led to the autocrat being overthrown, so this paper takes the new government into account

regarding outcome. This will be studied by examining Freedom House’s Freedom of
Government variables in each state from 2004-present. Freedom House measures the freedom of
a government annually with a 7-point scale, with 1 being the most free and 7 being the least.
They rate three variables on this scale: freedom, civil liberties, and political rights and determine
if a state is free or not free on the score of each variable. This will go all the way back to 2005
even though Arab Spring occurred in 2011 to give background on how democratic and free each
government was before the Arab Spring. How democratic and free each government turned out
is a great indicator on outcome of a revolution because the purpose of these revolts was for the
people to gain more individual rights and freedoms from the oppressive autocratic governments
in power. A state will either be successful and transition into a free democracy after Arab Spring
or will revert back to an autocracy. The outcome would also be considered a failure if the state
reverted back to another revolution, has multiple governments declaring legitimacy, or is
considered a failed state. Although having an autocratic government is far from ideal, it is a
better result than a failed state that has no government.
The Rise of Democracy in Tunisia:
It is appropriate to begin with Tunisia since it was the origin of Arab Spring. The
movement began in December of 2010 when a street vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi set
himself on fire to protest the Tunisian government (Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens 2014).
This act sparked largescale protests across all of Tunisia as a fight against the poor conditions
within the state (Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens 2014). President Ben Ali constantly restricted
the human rights of his people by arresting and torturing political opponents and human rights
activists (Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens 2014). The poor human rights conditions along with
government corruption and poor economic conditions were why Tunisians protested the Ali

regime after Bouazizi’s martyrdom (Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens 2014). These protests
eventually led to Ben Ali’s resignation in January 2011 as hundreds of people were killed
throughout the revolt (Mullin and Shahshahani 2012).
The people fighting for more rights received almost no support from foreign states during
and after the revolution. Although it may seem like Western democracies such as the US and
states EU would want a democracy in the MENA region, they did not actively assist the Tunisian
people (Mullin and Shahshahani 2011). The US and EU even supported the Ben Ali regime
during its time in power because Ali was an ally in the Bush administration’s war on terror
(Mullin and Shahshahani 2011). They overlooked Ali’s numerous human rights violations and
poor treatment of his people to protect their security interests in the region (Mullin and
Shahshahani 2011). The US even praised Tunisia for passing an antiterrorism law in 2003 which
Ben Ali used to target his political opponents and other threats to his autocratic power (Mullin
and Shahshahani 2011). From a strategic standpoint, the US focus on the war on terror led to
their support of the Ben Ali regime so it makes sense that they would not come assist the
Tunisian people in overthrowing him even when Ali was completely against the democratic
principles that the US stands for. Either outcome of the revolution would be favorable for the US
as a democracy in a region with few democracies would form or a longtime strategic ally would
retain power. Not taking a side would prevent the US from losing favor with the eventual winner
of the revolution and they could still work with Tunisia to pursue their interests.
The United States was not the only state to avoid intervention during Tunisia’s revolution
because of prior commitment to the Ali regime. France also decided not to help the Tunisian
rebels in favor of Ben Ali (Attir and Laremont 2016). This was because of Ali’s declaration as an
ally in the war on terror. The French government even offered to help Ali put down the rebellion

by sending troops (Attir and Laremont 2016). For France during Arab Spring their domestic
politics became a factor that determined possible intervention. For example, the French president
decided to intervene in Libya because his approval rating was low, and the majority of the
French people favored the overthrow of Qaddafi (Attir and Laremont 2016). The Tunisian
Revolution occurred before the Libyan revolution so the political landscape in France must have
changed during that period. The French people must have been more aware of the Libyan
Revolution because it is unlikely that a presidential approval rating would decline drastically in a
few months span and even if it did decline, the president would not miss an opportunity to
increase approval.
Overall foreign intervention from both the West and Middle Eastern states was low
because of a lack of interest from foreign states. Since Tunisia was relatively isolated and lacked
oil production, other states did not focus on their revolution (Moghadam 2017). The isolation
prevented Tunisia from being as important to the security interests of the West, since it was
farther from the Middle East than the other two states being studied. It also led to less interaction
between Tunisia and the Gulf States so there was less of a rivalry between them. Regarding a
lack of oil, this decreased the economic interest as oil is a major industry in the MENA region.
The lack of oil meant there was less at stake economically for Western states because they did
not have to intervene to protect any industry. It also decreased the economic interest of the
Middle Eastern states because they did not have the need to destabilize a rival exporter to
increase their own oil profits.
From 2004-2018, Tunisia transitioned from “not free” to “partly free” all the way to
“free.” According to Freedom House Tunisia was not free from 2004-2007, receiving a 5.5 out of
7 for freedom, a 5 out of 7 for civil liberties, and a 6 out of 7 for political rights (Freedom House

2004-2007). Tunisia became even more oppressed in 2008 as between 2008-2011 it scored a 6
for freedom, 5 for civil liberties, and 7 for political rights (Freedom House 2008-2011). This
decrease in freedom occurred because the constitution was changed so that Ben Ali could seek
reelection for a 6th term and proceeded to win that election with almost 90% of the vote
(Freedom House 2009). After Ben Ali was overthrown in January of 2011, they held
parliamentary elections in October of the same year in which the Islamist party won the plurality
of the votes (Freedom House 2012). These elections were originally supposed to occur in July of
2011, but the interim government decided to postpone them until October because there were
economic and infrastructural issues that could have prevented a free election (Sadiki and
Bouandel 2016). It is possible that if foreign states were involved, they could have rushed the
Tunisian parliamentary elections because they would want to see Tunisia transition into a
democracy as quickly as possible. The isolation prevented Tunisia from feeling any pressure to
transition which allowed them to take their time to get it right. This free parliamentary election
and the overthrow of the longtime autocrat helped Tunisia transition from not free to partly free.
They remained at partly free from 2012-2014 with a freedom score of either 3 or 3.5 during that
time, a civil liberty score between 3-4, and a political rights score of 3 (Freedom House 20122014).
Tunisia made the full transition into a free state in 2014 with the drafting of a new
constitution, a free presidential election, and another round of parliamentary elections (Freedom
House 2015). These events were huge in Tunisia’s development into a democracy because the
outcome of the election showed that its young democracy had lasting power. The state created a
constitution with strong democratic values and had its first peaceful transition of power as the
secular liberal party won more seats than the Islamic party (Sadiki and Bouandel 2016). The

constitution was able to develop, and this transition of power was so peaceful because of the
relationship between the major political parties. While the Islamist party was in power they often
cooperated with rival political parties (Yumitro and Estriani 2017). Since these parties had a
working relationship, it made it much easier for the Islamist party to give up power. It was
impressive that the Tunisian people were holding their government accountable and used
participation in democracy to fix state problems. The Islamic party was ousted because there was
a rise of religious extremism and violence and they ultimately failed to promote social justice
(Sadiki and Bouandel 2016). The Tunisian people immediately bought into their new democracy
and through democratic participation used it to demand social justice changes that they were
calling for since Arab Spring. This helped Tunisia gain the free status in 2015 and keep it ever
since as their freedom score ranged from 2-2.5, the civil liberty score was 3, and their political
rights score ranged from 1-2 from 2015-2018 (Freedom House 2018). With a low level of
foreign intervention Tunisia successfully transitioned into a free democracy.
The Fall of the Qaddafi Regime and the Rise of Civil War in Libya:
The revolution in Libya received much more international attention than the one in its
western neighbor Tunisia. Protests in Libya occurred in February of 2011 and the West
immediately became involved in the revolution (Selim 2013). In late February, the United States
aligned itself with Libya’s Transitional National Council (TNC), which was the primary
opposition against Qaddafi to gain influence over the new government when the Qaddafi regime
eventually fell (Selim 2013). On March 17, 2011 the United Nations Security Council passed
Resolution 1973 which called for a no-fly zone over Libya and allowed for foreign states to
intervene in Libya to protect the Libyan civilians and develop a ceasefire between the Qaddafi
regime and the rebels (Security Council 2011). But by the time this resolution was adopted

French troops were already involved in Libya and fired on Qaddafi’s troops possibly prior to the
resolution’s adoption (Attir and Laremont 2016). Britain was also already involved in Libya
before the resolution was adopted so both states decided to intervene militarily before seeking
receiving international approval (Attir and Laremont 2016). A possible reason as for why France
was leading the charge in Libya was because of their domestic politics. At the time president
Sarkozy’s approval ratings were extremely low and some people in his administration believed
that this intervention would boost his public approval (Attir and Laremont 2016). This desire to
increase domestic favor could explain why France was one of the leaders of NATO’s military
intervention in Libya.
Britain and the US were the other two major leaders in NATO’s airstrikes against Libya.
During this military operation, they ended up not following the guidelines set by the Security
Council Resolution by siding with the rebels instead of trying to stop the fighting (Selim 2013).
Although the goal of the resolution was to create a ceasefire that would protect civilians, the US
rejected an African Union ceasefire proposal that was accepted by the Libyan government (Selim
2013). After they sided with the rebels these major powers shifted the focus of the military
intervention from humanitarian intervention to overthrowing Qaddafi (Selim 2013). This shift
occurred because the West wanted to protect their interests in Libya and they believed a proWestern regime propped up by them would better suit their interests than Qaddafi. Before the
rebellion, the US already had poor relations with Qaddafi which made them believe he was
unreliable to serve their interests in the region (Hana 2017). Most of these interests were
economic as Libya is a major oil exporter and most of the economy was dependent on oil (Khan
and Mezran 2016). Not only was there a massive oil industry, it was collectivized by Qaddafi so
private companies in Libya were not generating wealth from the oil industry (Khan and Mezran

2016). Overthrowing Qaddafi could provide more opportunities for Western companies in Libya
because they could tap into Libya’s massive oil reserves. Also, it would be in the best interest for
the West to have a shorter rebellion, so Libya could resume normal oil production. When the
fighting broke out, oil production in Libya decreased drastically (Khan and Mezran 2016). This
would incentivize Western states to intervene to end the rebellion quickly, so Libya can get back
to exporting oil and no longer harm their interstate trade, especially France who was Libya’s
sixth largest trading partner (Hana 2017). This economic factor along with prior negative
interactions with Qaddafi made Western states much more interested in Libya than Tunisia, since
Tunisia lacked the oil capacity of Libya and Ben Ali was a traditional Western ally.
The Western powers were not the only states involved in Libya. Some of the Gulf States
attempted to use the conflict in Libya to spread their regional influence. Similar to the US some
of the Gulf States: Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE had poor relations with Qaddafi, so these states
saw the Arab Spring revolution in Libya as an opportunity to overthrow him (Lynch 2018).
These states used their media influence to highlight Qaddafi’s various human rights violations,
which pushed the West to intervene (Lynch 2018). The Arab League also passed a resolution that
influenced the UN to support international humanitarian intervention (Lynch 2018). These states
were also involved during the intervention as Qatar even provided military support in the form of
airstrikes and elite troops (Boduszyński 2015). Although not every Gulf State provided direct
military support like Qatar, they were indirectly involved with the conflict by arming rebel
groups (Lynch 2018). This destabilized Libya even more because Qatar and UAE were
supplying different rebel groups and continued to supply them long after the overthrow of
Qaddafi (Boduszyński 2015). This prevented one group from having enough military capability
to take over the entire state of Libya and defeat the other rebel groups, thus prolonging the civil

war. With both the West and Gulf States being involved in the Libyan revolution by acted both
unilaterally and through international organizations such as the Arab League, NATO, and UN
Security Council there was a high level of foreign involvement in Libya.
Libya’s Freedom House score slightly improved from 2004 to 2018 because it would
have been statistically impossible for Libya to regress. From 2004-2011 Libya scored all 7’s for
freedom, civil liberties, and political rights making it as not free as possible (Freedom House
2004-2011). They remained not free in 2012 but transitioned to partly free in 2013 and 2014 with
a freedom score of 4.5, a civil liberty score of 5, and a political rights score of 4 during both
years (Freedom House 2012-2014). This increase in freedom occurred because in 2012 after the
fall of the Qaddafi regime the new Libyan state held parliamentary elections (Freedom House
2013). The liberal party won a plurality of the votes in this election while Libya’s Muslim
Brotherhood affiliate finished in second (Freedom House 2013). Although this seemed like a step
in the right direction for Libya, this newly created Congress ultimately lacked enforcement
power and the civil war escalated as the Eastern part of the state attempted to create their own
government (Freedom House 2014). The escalation of the civil war led to Libya’s reversion back
to a not free state in 2015 and they have remained not free since with a freedom score between 66.5, a civil liberty score of 6, and a political rights score that ranged from 6-7 (Freedom House
2015-2018). The different warring tribal groups could not reconcile as the civil war continued
and Libya ended up turning into a failed state (Aras and Yorulmazlar 2016). The fact that Qatar
and the UAE were still providing arms and funding to different rebel groups mThe United
Nations attempted to prop up one of the governments, but it was not widely recognized
throughout the state as law and order within Libya eventually broke down (Freedom House
2016). This war eventually became three sided and the civil war along with the chaos it brought

still continues in Libya today (Freedom House 2018). Although Libya had extremely minor
improvements in their Freedom House scores, these improvements were not enough to classify
the revolution as a positive one. That is because the scores are still extremely poor as Libya is
still classified as, “not free” and the state is currently in a three-way civil war that has descended
Libya into failed statehood.
Overall the high foreign intervention in Libya’s revolution ended up harming the state.
That is because both the West and the Gulf states that intervened had different interests and
reasons for intervening. The Gulf states saw this revolution as an opportunity to overthrow a
rival in Qaddafi and to expand their influence in the Middle East (Lynch 2018). The Gulf States
had no desire to create a democratic Libya because they are autocratic and having democracies in
the region could hinder their influence on their own people. Not only did they want to harm their
rival Libya, some Gulf States used the revolution to fuel the rivalries with each other. Qatar and
UAE armed different rebel groups during the rebellion against Qaddafi and during the civil war
that broke out after Qaddafi was removed from power (Lynch 2018). Since these states turned
the revolution into a proxy war, they were not concerned with the outcome regarding if the
Libyan people installed a government that the people wanted. They were only concerned with
overthrowing a rival and putting a regime in place that would benefit their interests.
This could be confirming evidence of Plattner’s theory that powerful autocratic states are
gaining more influence on the world stage and the world power of the United States and Western
democracy is in decline. If the West intervened in Libya to purely help the Libyan people
overthrow a ruthless dictator and transition into a free state, they were ultimately used by the
Gulf States. Since these states used the media to turn the West against Qaddafi and then pushed
the Security Council to pass Resolution 1973, it is possible that these autocracies were driving

the foreign intervention in Libya. Either the Gulf States got the West to help them gain more
influence in the MENA region or the West intervened for political and economic gain. If the
West decided to intervene to protect their oil interests and increase their approval ratings, then
the Libyan Revolution would fit more into Phiri and Matambo’s theory that western intervention
in Africa under the false pretense of democracy building has only been harmful for African states
(Phiri and Matambo 2017). There is also some evidence of this because after Qaddafi was
overthrown, every government backed by the West was rejected by the Libyan people. For
example, the parliament that was elected a year after Qaddafi was overthrown had absolutely no
enforcement power, which led to part of the state trying to form its own government and
intensifying the civil war (Freedom House 2014). Also, the UN tried to prop up one of the
governments and most of the Libyan people did not recognize its legitimacy (Freedom House
2016). Either the West intervened in Libya to spread democracy which was undermined by the
power struggle of the Gulf States showing a declining influence of democracy, or the West
intervened to pursue political and economic interests while exploiting a weaker African state.
Regardless of the motives behind intervention, it was not in the best interest of the Libyan people
as their state failed and became plagued with civil war.
The Egyptian Revolution and its Regression back to Autocracy:
The Arab Spring revolution in Egypt occurred shortly after protests in Tunisia broke out.
In January 2011, Khalid Said was beaten to death in police custody and gruesome pictures of his
body were released on social media, causing unrest among the Egyptian people (Callaway and
Harrelson-Stephens 2014). The Egyptian people quickly used social media to organize protests
that began on January 25, 2011 in Tahrir Square (Collins and Rothe 2012). These protests lasted
until mid-February until President Mubarak eventually decided to step down (Collins and Rothe

2012). Mubarak tried to concede some of his power by announcing he would not run for
reelection, but the protesters persisted until his resignation (Collins and Rothe 2012). He
eventually resigned because of the powerful Egyptian military’s decision to side with the
protestors and top military officials ended up taking over the interim government after
Mubarak’s resignation (Arena 2016).
This military interim government called the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
(SCAF) was immediately backed by the United States (Selim 2013). The US originally publicly
supported Mubarak because he was an ally for the past 30 years, but the Obama Administration
decided to call for his resignation when they realized the people were going to overthrow him
(Arena 2016). With this longtime ally pushed out of power, the US needed to forge a relationship
with the new government to protect their interests in the region. These were primarily security
interests as the US was especially concerned with protecting Israel and its 1979 peace treaty with
Egypt (Selim 2013). The US had the ability to heavily influence the SCAF because of the large
amount of aid the US sends to Egypt and a large percentage of that aid goes to the Egyptian
military (Selim 2013). According to Selim, the US gave the Egyptian military $1.3 billion in
2011 alone (Selim 2013). The military had received aid from the US since 1979 after the Camp
David Accords (Arena 2016).
The US then attempted to help Egypt transition into a democracy. They began working
with the Muslim Brotherhood and helped Mohammad Morsi become president after elections
were held in June 2012 (Selim 2013). According to Selim, the Muslim Brotherhood claimed
Morsi’s victory when only 52% of the vote was reported and the US backed their illegal
maneuver because the Brotherhood guaranteed that Morsi would promote US interests (Selim
2013). This promise was backed as Morsi helped negotiate a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas

in 2013 (Arena 2016). The US supported Morsi even though some of his policies were
undemocratic. Morsi severely weakened Egypt’s judiciary and made the newly created
constitution much more Islamic (Arena 2016). But the US continued to provide millions of
dollars in aid because he was fulfilling US interests in the region. The Morsi government was
eventually overthrown by the military in 2013 and Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces Abdel
Fattah el-Sisi took over as the leader of Egypt (Arena 2016). The Untied States never recognized
it as a military coup, and only slightly held back aid which was reinstated a year and a half later
(Arena 2016). Although President Obama rhetorically supported a free Egypt, the US continued
to cooperate with and send millions of dollars in aid to multiple governments that oppressed the
Egyptian people in order to protect US security interests in the region.
The United States was not the only state involved in Egypt during Arab Spring to protect
their interests. The Gulf States were also involved in Egypt to preserve their influence in the
region. They intervened after Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood took over Egypt because they
saw the Brotherhood as a rival to their Sunni Muslim supremacy (Aras and Yorulmazlar 2016).
Saudi Arabia led the charge because they did not want Arab Spring to spread to their state and
undo their power and influence in the Middle East (Aras and Yorulmazlar 2016). They also did
not want the Muslim Brotherhood in power because they wanted to halt the rise of a rival Sunni
group that could possibly threaten their influence (Aras and Yorulmazlar 2016). There was
evidence of this dislike for the Brotherhood when Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE pledged to
bailout Egypt’s economy if the military overthrew Morsi (Bellin 2018). The day after the coup,
these states sent $12 billion to Egypt to help the state overcome its economic woes (Bellin 2018).
Like in Libya, the Gulf states intervened in Egypt to preserve their regional power and influence.

With the intervention of both the Gulf States and the US, the level of foreign involvement
in Egypt can be classified as medium. This involvement mostly occurred through unilateral
actions to preserve their interests in Egypt during the turmoil and there was little collective
intervention through international organizations. There was also no direct military intervention
like there was in Libya. The Egyptian military was strong enough to carry out foreign interests
since they were strong enough to overthrow the government twice in two years. Most of the
foreign intervention came through financial means as the US and Gulf States provided this strong
military with much needed economic relief and funding for the military itself.
Egypt’s freedom score remained about the same for the entire period studied. From 20042012, Egypt was not free and had a freedom score of 6 in 2004 and 5.5 from 2005-2012, a civil
liberty score of 6 in 2004 and 5 from 2005-2012 and a political rights score of 6 from 2004-2012
(Freedom House 2004-2012). This period was during the Mubarak era and he acted as a typical
autocrat by silencing and imprisoning critics along with keeping Egypt in a constant state of
emergency (Freedom House 2009). They were only partly free in 2013 as freedom, civil
liberties, and political rights were all 5 out of 7 (Freedom House 2013). This is because of the
elections held in 2012 which were considered partly free as Morsi won the presidency and the
Muslim Brotherhood took over the majority in parliament (Freedom House 2013). They reverted
back to being not free in 2014 and remained not free as they scored between 5.5 and 6 in
freedom, 5 and 6 in civil liberties, and 6 in political rights (Freedom House 2014-2018). This is
because the military overthrew the partially democratically elected Morsi and reverted back to
authoritarian rule (Freedom House 2014).
Egypt demonstrates the harm that foreign intervention had on these revolutions. The
protests on Mubarak and the beginning of the revolution had potential to turn Egypt into a free

democratic state, but this was wiped out by the strong military presence (Yumitro and Estriani
2017). Some literature only blames the strong military as the reason behind Egypt’s
revolutionary failure, but the military was not the one making the decisions. The decisions were
being made by the US and the Gulf States and they simply used the military as a tool to put in
place Egyptian governments that suited their interests. The military initially did not want to
overthrow Morsi because it would destroy the economy and they only did it after the Gulf States
promised to bail them out (Bellin 2018). Initially, they were on the Egyptian people’s side when
they removed Mubarak from power. The US ultimately enabled the military’s undemocratic
behavior by providing so much aid to the non-democratic SCAF and not cutting off aid to the
Sisi regime when it became an autocracy. The US could have limited or even cut off military and
economic aid at any point, but they were too concerned about their strategic interests to do so.
Even a moderate level of foreign involvement proved problematic for a state going through a
revolution.
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Tunisia had the least foreign intervention during their revolution and experienced the
most success while Libya and Egypt had high and medium levels of foreign intervention and
their revolutions ended up failing. This supports the first hypothesis that if a state has more
foreign intervention during a revolution, then it is less likely to become a free democratic state.
The lack of foreign intervention allowed Tunisia to develop their own type of democracy and
take as much time as they needed to develop it. Since Tunisia is isolated, there were no foreign
interests at stake when they revolted so other states felt no need to intervene (Moghadam 2017).
This prevented a foreign actor from quickly propping up a government that the people did not
support, which occurred in states whose revolutions were influenced by foreign actors. It allowed
the new government to form into something that the people of Tunisia wanted to create, which
supports Gaffar’s findings that these MENA states need to create their own form of democracy
in order to successfully transition into one (Gaffar 2017). Their revolution was truly based on the
principles of democracy and social justice because they successfully transitioned into a
democracy after the revolution. The Islamic and secular political parties were able to naturally
find common ground and work together to provide a free democratic government to the Tunisian
people (Selim 2013). The cooperation between the two parties supports Bratton’s theory that
Islam and democracy are in fact compatible and helps reject theories that believe the two cannot
coexist.
Both Libya and Egypt experienced more foreign intervention and ultimately had
unsuccessful revolutions. Although it is unclear if these states would have transitioned into free
democratic states if they were left isolated, foreign intervention definitely hindered their ability
to transition. That is because the foreign intervention occurred primarily to protect the interests

of the foreign actors and not assist the revolting state. In Libya, the Gulf States used the Arab
Spring to topple the Qaddafi regime and attempt to gain regional power and influence over each
other. The West was either involved to promote democracy, for their own political and economic
interests, or a combination of both. This involvement led to a quick overthrow of Qaddafi, but it
hurt Libya in the long run because after the fall of Qaddafi the rebel groups began fighting a
bloody civil war to determine who would control the state. This failed revolution in Libya
confirms some of the ideas of both Phiri and Matambo and Plattner. It reinforces Plattner’s
theory that autocracies are gaining world influence because the Gulf States had such a prominent
role in shaping Libya (Plattner 2015). It confirms Phiri and Matambo’s idea that Western
intervention is not well received in African states because the rebel groups would not recognize
the government propped up by the United Nations (Phiri and Matambo 2017).
In Egypt, there was less foreign involvement than in Libya, but they still failed to create a
free democratic state. The main foreign actors were the US and the Gulf States, and they did not
need to intervene militarily or use international organizations like in Libya. That was because of
the stability of the Egyptian military as these states would just pay the military to carry out their
interests. The large amount of aid the US gives the Egyptian military immediately gave them
leverage in Egypt after the fall of Mubarak (Arena 2016). Instead of prioritizing a true
democratic transition, they focused on creating a government that would serve their security
interests and maintain good relations with Israel (Arena 2016). The US were so concerned with
these interests that they would often turn a blind eye when these Egyptian government exhibited
autocratic tendencies (Arena 2016). This influence along with the influence of the Gulf States
that wanted to increase their regional influence and stop the Arab Spring helped Egypt revert into
an autocratic government.

This proves the primary hypothesis that if there was more foreign intervention in a
revolution, then it would be less likely that it would become a free democratic state. Since
Tunisia experienced the lowest foreign intervention and transitioned into a free democracy, while
Libya and Egypt had higher levels of intervention and reverted to autocracy. All three states are
in the same region in the world, had revolted against decades of autocratic rule at the same time,
and overthrow the long serving autocrat, making most of the domestic factors surrounding the
revolution relatively similar. Level of foreign involvement was the major difference in all three
revolutions as one of the major domestic differences is the power of the military. This only
separates Egypt as their military had much more influence on their revolution than Libya and
Tunisia (Yumitro and Estriani 2017). Although Egypt’s military was much more powerful than
the militaries of the other two case studies and overthrew the government twice in two years, the
military was not acting on its own (Arena 2016). The military was essentially an agent of the US
because of the millions of dollars in annual aid the US sends to the military, so the Egyptian
military was carrying out the goals and interests of foreign actors such as the US (Arena 2016).
The Gulf States also used the Egyptian military to carry out their interests in the state (Bellin
2018). Therefore, the military in Egypt became a product of foreign intervention and a
mechanism used by foreign actors to change the outcome of the revolution in Egypt. Since the
military can be incorporated into foreign intervention, most of the factors in the three states
beside level of intervention are similar. Thus, it can be determined that the hypothesis was
supported because foreign intervention was a hindrance on freedom and democratic growth for
the revolutions studied.
Conclusion:

When the Arab Spring broke out in 2011, the West became optimistic that the MENA
region would successful transition from their longtime autocracies to free democratic states. This
was not the case as seven years later Tunisia became the only democratic state. The rest either
became autocracies again, or worse declined into a failed state plagued by civil war. This paper
took an important look on how foreign actors shaped these revolutions and contributed to either
democracy, autocracy, or failed statehood. It found that isolated Tunisia benefited from their
isolation while states with more foreign influence such as Libya and Egypt had their democratic
growth hindered by foreign actors. This was because most of the foreign influence came from the
autocratic Gulf States who were trying to use the revolutions to increase their influence on the
region. Also, the Western states that intervened were often involved to protect their political and
economic interests and that often took precedent over democracy building. These findings are
significant because if states or international organizations decide to intervene in a transitioning
state for truly liberal purposes, it would be best for them to analyze how other states are getting
involved and what interests they may have in the conflict. It also shows that autocratic states in
the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia are gaining power and influence over the MENA region.
This could also be helpful in analyzing the impact on foreign actors in the current Syrian civil
war and determine how they have hindered possible state growth.
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